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Research using the list before last paradigm demonstrates that retrieval of a 
previously learned list (L0) between encoding of two other lists (L1 and L2) leads to 
forgetting of L1 -- an effect attributed to internal context-change (e.g., Jang & Huber, 
2008; Sahakyan & Hendricks, 2012).  In the current studies, I manipulated the nature of 
the material participants were asked to retrieve between L1 and L2 (Experiment 1), or the 
temporal distance between L0 and the remaining lists (Experiment 2) in order to examine 
whether such manipulations induce greater levels of context change.  Specifically, in 
Experiment 1, some participants retrieved a previously encoded list of words (L0), 
whereas others retrieved a short video that they were exposed to earlier. In Experiment 2, 
L0 was studied either 1-hour or 14 days prior to the session where L1 and L2 were 
studied.  To assess the magnitude of context change, both L1 recall accuracy and 
retrospective time estimates were analyzed.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Imagine that you are at a conference, where you have just been introduced to a 
new person and you want to be sure that you remember his/her name.  Like many, you 
may employ a common strategy – once you are told the person’s name, you might begin 
your next sentence with the name (e.g., “James, nice to meet you”). This can be an 
effective strategy.  By generating/retrieving the person’s name, you help to ensure that 
the name has been properly encoded.   However, imagine that the person then asks you a 
question about some research you completed years ago.  After attempting to answer the 
question, you might find yourself in an embarrassing but familiar situation.  You might 
realize that you no longer remember the person’s name. This is not too surprising 
considering what is known about the effects of retrieval on forgetting.  
Research shows that retrieval of some information can lead to forgetting of other 
information that presides in memory. In the laboratory, such effects are demonstrated by 
having participants study list(s) of items, then retrieving some of the items (or some of 
the lists), and observing the effects of such retrieval on the remaining items/lists that were 
not retrieved. Forgetting can take place in form of impaired access to an entire list of 
items, as shown in research involving the list-before-last (LBL) paradigm (e.g., Jang & 
Huber, 2008; Sahakyan & Hendricks, 2012; Shiffrin, 1970), but it can occur at the level  
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of semantic representations of individual items, as shown in research using the retrieval-
practice paradigm (e.g., Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994).  Current research utilizes the 
LBL paradigm, whereby participants encode several lists, and after study of each list, 
they are told to retrieve the previous list (not the most recent).  Prior work shows that the 
act of retrieving a previously encoded list of words causes forgetting of a more-recently 
learned list (e.g., Sahakyan & Hendricks, 2012; Sahakyan & Smith, 2014). 
The aim of the current research is to address discrepant findings between two 
recently conducted investigations. Briefly, Delaney, Sahakyan, Kelley, and Zimmerman 
(2010) found that retrieval of events from longer ago caused greater forgetting of more 
recently encoded information, whereas Sahakyan and Hendricks (2012) found that 
regardless of the age of the retrieved memory, the magnitude of forgetting for more 
recent information is unaffected. The two studies utilized different methods and 
paradigms, with Sahakyan and Hendricks (2012) using the LBL paradigm, and Delaney 
et al. (2010) utilizing the diversionary thought paradigm (described later). These two 
paradigms are related by the nature of their underlying mechanism as both take their roots 
in research on directed forgetting. I describe each paradigm and related research in the 
next sections.  
List-before-last Paradigm  
The list-before-last (LBL) paradigm was originally invented by Shiffrin (1970) in 
an attempt to study whether forgetting in long-term memory was due to time decay or 
interference. In the classic version of LBL, participants study multiple lists, and starting 
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with the second list, they are asked to retrieve the previous list rather than the current list. 
However, some studies have used an abbreviated version of the paradigm, whereby 
participants study only three lists (L0, L1, and L2, respectively) and, after L1 encoding, 
they are told to either retrieve L0 or to solve math problems as a control condition (e.g., 
Sahakyan & Hendricks, 2012).  Afterwards, all participants encode L2 and are 
subsequently tested for their memory of L1 using a free recall test.  The typical findings 
show that participants who are required to retrieve L0 in between L1 and L2 exhibit 
forgetting of L1 on the final test (e.g., Sahakyan & Hendricks, 2012; Sahakyan & Smith, 
2013). In addition to the negative effects of retrieval, there are also positive effects of 
retrieval, whereby the interference from L2 on L1 is reduced. These positive effects of 
retrieval have been demonstrated in terms of reduced effects of list-length manipulation 
(e.g., Jang & Huber, 2008; Shiffrin, 1970) or in terms of reduced intrusions from L2 on 
L1 (e.g., Sahakyan & Hendricks, 2012). These effects have been explained in terms of L0 
retrieval trials producing an accelerated mental context change between L1 and L2 (Jang 
& Huber, 2008; Sahakyan & Hendricks, 2012).  Mental context can be broadly defined as 
any information that is actively represented in mind as people encode lists of items. It 
refers to incidental or background stimuli that are also present during encoding of a target 
item, including the spatial-temporal environment in which items are encoded, the internal 
states of the participants, as well as the thoughts they experience in response to the items 
during encoding.  Some of these stimuli are perceived by the observer, whereas others 
may escape a person’s deliberate attention.  Nonetheless, these stimuli—whether 
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intentionally processed or not— can serve as cues during the retrieval of target items and 
these context cues gradually fluctuate over time as new information is processed and as 
new cues are generated.  Thus, over time, a mismatch begins to form between the current 
context and the context in which a previous item was learned.  This mismatch between 
encoding and retrieval contexts—or context change—leads to reduced access to the 
encoding context thereby producing forgetting of those items (Estes, 1955; Mensink & 
Raaijmakers, 1988; Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002).  
Sahakyan and Hendricks (2012) argued that in the math group of the LBL 
paradigm, the context associated with each list drifts from one list to the next list in a 
somewhat gradual fashion, thus the contexts between any two adjacent lists are more 
similar to each other than the contexts between more distally separated lists.  However, in 
the retrieval group, retrieval of L0 disrupts the similarity of the contexts of the L1 and L2 
lists, creating an accelerated contextual drift between them, as though by temporally 
shifting or segregating them from each other.  During the final test, it becomes more 
difficult to reinstate the context of L1 due to a larger mismatch between L1 and L2 
contexts.  As a result, the L0 retrieval group recalls fewer L1 items than the math group.  
Thus, via internal context change, retrieval of a previous list causes the forgetting of the 
more-recently learned list (Jang & Huber, 2008; Sahakyan & Kelley, 2012, Sahakyan & 
Smith, 2014). 
More relevant to the current investigation is one of the experiments of Sahakyan 
and Hendricks (2012), where the authors attempted to vary the degree of internal context 
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change experienced by participants by varying the lag between L0 and the subsequent 
two lists (e.g., L1 and L2). Specifically, in an initial session, they had participants encode 
L0 and then asked them to return for a second session at a later time.  This second session 
occurred one hour, 24 hours, or 72 hours after the first session.  This meant that, for some 
participants, L0 was more temporally distant from L1 and L2 than for other participants.  
Sahakyan and Hendricks expected that an increase in the temporal distance of L0 would 
initiate greater levels of mental context change when L0 is retrieved between the 
remaining two lists, and that greater degree of mental context change should be 
evidenced by poorer recall of L1.  However, their results did not support this prediction.  
They found that all groups that engaged in L0 retrieval experienced similar magnitude of 
L1 forgetting at the time of final test regardless of how long ago L0 was studied.  In other 
words, retrieval of more temporally distant events from memory did not affect the degree 
of forgetting of more recently encoded materials.  
These findings counter those of Delaney et al. (2010), who used the diversionary 
thought paradigm (described next), and found that retrieving more temporally distant 
events from memory caused greater forgetting of previously-learned list (compared to 
retrieving temporally-nearby events).  
The Diversionary Thought Paradigm  
The idea that L0 retrieval causes a larger shift in context between L1 and L2 is 
derived from previous research on directed forgetting (DF) and the related diversionary 
thought experiments (e.g., Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002).  In a typical list-method directed 
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forgetting (DF) experiment, participants are given two lists of words (L1 and L2).  In 
between the lists, some participants are told to forget the first list whereas others are told 
to remember the first list.  The results of such experiments indicate that participants in the 
forget condition are indeed able to forget L1 items when told to do so compared to the 
remember group.  Sahakyan and Kelley (2002) collected retrospective verbal reports 
from their participants, many of who reported that in response to the forget instruction, 
they tried to think of other things unrelated to the experiment in order to forget unwanted 
items. Building upon such evidence, Sahakyan and Kelley (2002) showed forgetting of 
L1 in the absence of any specific instructions to forget. By employing what has become 
known in the literature as the diversionary thought paradigm, they asked participants to 
think of something else pre-specified by the experimenter in between the study of two 
lists of words (e.g., “imagine if you were invisible”). When L1 memory was tested during 
the final test, participants in the diversionary thought condition (similar to those who are 
told to forget L1) showed comparably poorer recall compared to the control participants 
who did not engage in diversionary thought and solved math problems instead.  Sahakyan 
and Kelley (2002) proposed that engaging in distracting thoughts shifts participants’ 
mental context between the two lists, making it more difficult to reinstate the original 
context of the to-be-forgotten list, thus creating impaired recall of L1.  
The diversionary thought paradigm has become a well-validated method of 
inducing internal context change (e.g., Delaney et al., 2010; Pastotter & Bauml, 2007; 
Unsworth, Spillers, & Brewer, 2011).  The type of diversionary thoughts that participants 
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were asked to engage in varied from study to study.  For example, participants have been 
asked to imagine being invisible (Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002), imagine their childhood 
home (Sahakyan & Delaney, 2003), daydream about vacations (Delaney et al., 2010), or 
even engage in a task that does not engage diversionary thought per se but more like a 
diversionary action such as to wipe a computer monitor (Mulji & Bodner, 2011). The 
results across all these studies mimic those of a DF experiment.  When L1 memory is 
tested during the final test, participants in the diversionary thought/action condition—
similar to those who are told to forget—show poorer recall compared to the control 
participants.  
In one of the diversionary thought experiments, Delaney et al. (2010) had 
participants study two lists and, in between those lists, asked participants to retrieve 
memories about their current home or about their childhood/parents’ home. They found 
that participants experienced more L1 forgetting at the time of final test as a consequence 
of retrieving memories related to their parents’ home compared to memories of their own 
home. More importantly, the longer it had been since participants had visited their 
parent’s home, the more L1 forgetting they exhibited.  In other words, if the to-be-
retrieved memory was from a more temporally distant past, it created more forgetting of 
the current list (e.g., L1). Delaney et al. (2010) attributed greater forgetting of L1 to 
larger change of mental context taking place between L1 and L2 as a consequence of 
retrieving more temporally distant events. 
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  Thus far, one study showed that retrieval of more distant events causes more 
forgetting of the current event (e.g., Delaney et al. 2010), whereas the other study showed 
that retrieval of more distant events causes the same magnitude of forgetting (e.g., 
Sahakyan & Hendricks, 2012).  Given that there were several major methodological 
differences between the two studies, the current investigation aimed to uncover the 
factors that could contribute to the discrepancy in findings.   
Assessing Context-Change through Retrospective Time Estimates 
Although mental context-change is an important theoretical construct central to 
formal theories of memory, it is typically inferred from assessing various indices of 
memory performance, including accuracy measures, response latency measures, as well 
as analyzing the dynamics of retrieval process itself, such as where in the list participants 
initiate retrieval, and how they transition between responses during retrieval. Overall, 
internal context is hard to experimentally manipulate in the lab, because it is difficult to 
define independent of memory performance. Our recent research suggests that 
retrospective duration estimates could be used as independent indicators of internal 
context change (Sahakyan & Smith, 2014).   
Retrospective time judgments are those made when participants are unaware that 
they will be asked to make a time estimate until after the time period has already passed.  
Because they are unaware that such information will be assessed, it is unlikely that 
participants will consciously attend to temporal information during the target interval, 
and hence time estimates must be based on information available from memory (for a 
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review, see Block & Zakay, 1997). Prior research shows that the type of information that 
people use in making these estimates involves memory for changes in context. For 
example, when two lists are studied in different physical contexts as opposed to the same 
context, the retrospective time estimates are longer in the different context condition 
compared to the same context (e.g., Block, 1982). Likewise, changes in cognitive context 
that result from encoding the items using different orienting tasks throughout the list as 
opposed to the same orienting task also lead to overestimation of the target interval 
(Block & Reed, 1978). Along the same lines, of the two intervals of the same objective 
duration and similar information processed, a segmented interval is remembered as being 
longer than an unsegmented interval (Poynter, 1983; Zakay, Tsal, Moses, & Shahar, 
1994).   
Finally, our own research using memory paradigms that are typically interpreted 
in terms of internal context-change, such as the DF paradigm (Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002), 
or the LBL paradigm (Jang & Huber, 2008) confirms that participants in conditions 
attributed to internal context-change provide significantly longer time estimates 
compared to participants in the respective control conditions (Sahakyan & Smith, 2014). 
Therefore, in the current experiments, I collected retrospective times estimates as 
additional measures of context-change to obtain corroborating evidence of context-
change that was independent of memory assessment.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
  
 
 One of the critical methodological differences between the Delaney et al. (2010) 
study and the Sahakyan and Hendricks (2012) study is the nature of the event participants 
were asked to retrieve between L1 and L2.  Namely, in the Delaney et al. (2010) study, 
participants were asked to recall their childhood home, whereas in Sahakyan and 
Hendricks (2012), participants were asked to recall a previously studied list of words.  It 
is possible that retrieval of dissimilar material (e.g., childhood home) creates more 
forgetting than retrieval of similar material (e.g., another list) because when the mind 
jumps back in time to retrieve previously encoded material that is so different from the 
current materials, it changes the current state of context between L1 and L2 in a more 
accelerated fashion than when the mind jumps back to more similar material. The 
similarity between the materials that are presiding in memory and what needs to be 
retrieved may safeguard against rapid contextual drift, whereas retrieval of dissimilar 
materials may drift the mental context to a greater extent. To investigate these 
possibilities, I manipulated the nature of the material retrieved between the two lists.  
Some participants retrieved L0 between L1 and L2, whereas others retrieved a previously 
seen video. 
11 
 
By using a video segment, I was better able to control for the subjective nature of 
the previously-used diversionary thought tasks (e.g., think about childhood home).  
Asking participants to recall their parents’ home may elicit a different experience for 
each participant as no two homes are the same—in terms of temporal distance, physical 
features, and even personal salience.  Previous researchers (Smith & Manzano, 2010) 
have utilized video in context-change research with success, and a video stands as a much 
more controlled and consistent exercise in diversionary thought.  If dissimilarity of 
materials is responsible for discrepant findings between the Delaney et al. (2010) and 
Sahakyan and Hendricks (2012) study, I expected that recalling a video between L1 and 
L2 would lead to the greater forgetting than recalling previously encoded L0. In addition, 
if retrieval of video creates greater internal context-change between L1 and L2, then I 
expected to obtain greater overestimation bias in time estimates in the Video group 
compared to the List group.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODS 
 
 
Participants 
A total of 85 participants were recruited in this experiment from the participant-
pool at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.  The experiment was completed 
in exchange for course credit.  
Materials 
Three lists (L0, L1, and L2) of unrelated words were used (see Appendix A).  
Each list contained 12 medium-frequency, unrelated nouns.  The words were five or six 
letters long, presented in random order, and the presentation order of the lists was fully 
counterbalanced.  Each list consisted of six animate and six inanimate objects because, as 
part of one of the orienting tasks, participants were asked to judge the words as animate 
or inanimate during encoding.  The video used in Session 1 was four minutes and 40 
seconds long, and consisted of a brief primer on perceptual illusions.  The video was 
colorful and engaging to ensure that participants paid close attention to the video and had 
plenty of possible information to encode.  The video can be found at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PN1NAiM55hU&feature=related.  Experimenters 
were provided digital watches in order to keep track of elapsed time when appropriate.  
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The music played in Session 1 was the “Star Wars Theme” played through the 
same computer speakers as the experiment.   
Design 
Each participant completed two separate sessions (Session 1 and Session 2). In 
Session 1, all participants were shown a list of words (L0) and also a brief video (in a 
counterbalanced order).  In Session 2, which took place an hour later, all participants 
encoded two lists of words (L1 and L2), and performed an intervening task between the 
two lists. There were three groups in the experiment based on the type of task completed 
between the lists in Session 2.  Some participants recalled L0 from Session 1 (termed the 
List group), some recalled a video from Session 1 (the Video group), and the remaining 
participants did not engage in retrieval of previously encoded event, but instead solved 
arithmetic problems (the Math group). The critical variables of interest involve memory 
for L1 as well as the subjective time estimates for Session 2.  
Procedure  
Before each session began, participants were asked to store their belongings in a 
separate and locked room.  This ensured that cell phones were not a distraction during 
any part of the experiment and this also denied participants the ability to check their 
phone for the time.  The main theme from Star Wars was played as participants entered 
the experiment room.  This music was included in order to mark the experiment as a 
unique event for participants (important for later recall of the episode).  In addition, I 
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wanted to elicit encoding of contextual information in more than one modality.  The 
experimenter shut off the music after the participant had read and signed the consent form 
and, at this point, the experimenter began the instructions.  The instructions were 
presented in pre-recorded audio format in order to equate the duration of the experiment 
across participants.  Care was taken to ensure that the instructions were presented through 
the computer speakers at a specific, pre-set volume for each trial.  This volume 
corresponded to the seventh setting on the speaker volume dial (Dell-Altec Lansing 
speakers model number CN-0W2739) while all computer settings were set at the 
maximum possible volume.  No participants reported difficulty in hearing the 
instructions. 
Because participants left the lab for one hour between Session 1 and Session 2, to 
prevent rehearsal between the sessions, an incidental memory task was used in Session 1.  
Participants were told that they were helping the experimenter choose a list of words for 
use in future experiments. During Session 1, all participants were presented with List 0 as 
well as an instructional video, and the order in which they were presented was 
counterbalanced—some participants saw the list first (three times), whereas others saw 
the video first (presented once).  List 0 was shown three times in different random orders 
each time and, through each presentation, participants were asked to perform a different 
orientating task.  All responses were made using a computer keyboard.  Multiple 
presentations of L0 were used to safeguard against floor recall levels given that Session 2 
took place after a delay. Throughout the first and the second presentation of L0, the 
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words were presented at a rate of four seconds per item with a one second inter-stimulus 
interval (ISI). During the first presentation of L0, participants were asked to provide a 
pleasantness rating for the words on a scale from 1-7, whereas during the second 
presentation, they were asked to categorize the word as either animate or inanimate. 
During the third presentation, they were asked to make up a sentence using the word and 
type it.  During this third presentation of the list, the presentation rate was self-paced. 
Participants were given as much time as needed to create each sentence, and they pressed 
the space-bar to advance to the next word.   
After L0 was presented three times, participants were given a 90 second free-
recall test for all L0 words they could remember.  An immediate test was also used by 
Sahakyan and Hendricks (2012) to minimize potential floor effects after a delay given 
that retrieval safeguards against forgetting (e.g., Roediger & Karpicke, 2006).  The free 
recall test was carried out on the computer, and the screen displayed each response so that 
participants could see all the words they recalled. After L0 encoding and test, participants 
were also shown an instructional video that lasted 4 minutes and 40 seconds (or vice 
versa – they viewed video first, followed by L0 encoding/test).   
For the video portion, participants were told they would be evaluating videos for 
use in freshman-level psychology courses.  After viewing the video, they were asked to 
provide three ratings for the video on a 7-point Likert scale — (1) the effectiveness of the  
video at explaining the material, (2) the difficulty of the material being discussed, and (3) 
the overall quality of the video.  These ratings were made by typing responses into a  
 
 
16 
 
computer.  After rating the video, participants were told to return for Session 2, which 
took place one hour later.  No details were provided as to the nature of Session 2.  
Consistent with previous research, Session 2 responses in all conditions were 
made on a separate sheet of paper instead of typing them on the computer screen 
(Sahakyan & Hendricks, 2012; Unsworth, Spillers, & Brewer, 2012).  During Session 2, 
participants were told that they would study two lists of words (L1 and L2), and that they 
should remember them for an upcoming memory test.  Thus, encoding in Session 2 was 
intentional rather than incidental consistent with previous research with the LBL 
paradigm. After the instructions, a red screen with a brief tone lasting two seconds 
appeared.  Participants were told to expect this screen with a tone as it marked the 
moment that the experiment officially began.  I marked the start of the experiment with 
the tone so that later on I could redirect participants’ attention to a defined  “start” of the 
session, and ask them to provide a retrospective estimate of how much time has passed in 
the experiment since that moment (that is, estimate the duration of Session 2).  After the 
red screen and the tone, participants were then oriented to the center of the computer 
screen with a plus sign and then shown L1 words.  The words in L1 were also presented 
at a rate of four seconds per word with a one second ISI.  There was no orienting task for 
either L1 or L2. After L1 encoding, some of the participants were asked to solve math 
problems for 90 seconds while the remaining participants were asked to either recall L0 
from Session 1 for 90 seconds, or to retrieve the video they were shown in Session 1 for 
90 seconds.  Specifically, participants asked to recall the video were told to mentally 
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reinstate their experience of the video and were prompted not only to think of the factual 
elements of the video, but to also imagine any sounds, colors, and thoughts they may 
have experienced during the entire video.  
After solving math, or retrieving L0 or the video, all participants were instructed 
to study L2 just as they had studied L1.  Once again, the words were presented for four 
seconds each with a one second ISI.  The last word of L2 was followed by another red 
screen and tone (the same tone used previously) so that the end of the study phase of the 
experiment was also clearly marked for the participants.  After the tone, all participants 
were asked to estimate how much time had passed between the two tones.  Participants 
wearing a watch were not told to remove it.  This is a measured decision based on a meta-
analysis of time judgment research that found that retrospective judgments tend to be 
significantly longer for participants who are told to remove their watch compared to those 
that are told nothing presumably because it draws attention to time, which nullifies the 
incidental nature of the task (Block & Zakay, 1997). Experimenters were instructed to 
monitor whether participants explicitly checked the time but, given that cell phones are 
now the primary source for this information, the presence of watches was rare.  
Nonetheless, zero instances were reported by experimenters.   
A space was provided on the computer screen for participants to type time 
estimates.  They were asked to give their estimate as accurately as possible—on the order 
of seconds.  Finally, participants were given 90 seconds to recall L1 by typing the words. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
 The probability of a Type 1 error was set to .05 for all analyses.  First I report 
memory accuracy to assess the magnitude of L1 forgetting effects, and then I report the 
time estimation data.  As is conventional with time estimation research (Roy & 
Christenfeld, 2007, 2008), the outliers above 2.5 standard deviations from the grand mean 
for time estimation were removed from the analyses.  Given the hypothesized 
relationship between time estimates and recall, this was also done for L1 recall results 
(totaling one participant for time estimation results and zero for recall results). 
Recall Results  
Given the incidental nature of the Session 1 encoding tasks, I examined overall 
recall rates for Session 1 to assess the degree of learning.  The Session 1 average recall 
proportion for L0 was quite high (M = .72, SD = .12).  After the one hour delay, during 
Session 2, participants’ recall of L0 (in between L1 and l2) was still relatively high (M = 
.55, SD = .14).  My critical prediction concerned L1 recall, and thus I assessed proportion 
of L1 recalled using a one-way ANOVA with Group (Video vs. List vs. Math) as a 
factor.  The results are shown in Figure 1. There were no significant group differences, 
F(2,81) = 1.23, p = .30, η
2
= .03 
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That is, regardless of the task performed between L1 and L2, the differences in L1 
recall did not reach statistical significance.  Further analyses also failed to support my 
initial prediction.  It was expected that the Video group would recall fewer L1 words 
compared to the Math group (the control group).  Planned comparison between the Video 
and the Math group revealed that the difference in L1 recall did not reach significance 
although numerically it was in the predicted direction, t(55) = 1.41, p = .16.  The same 
pattern was obtained also between the List group and the Math group, although 
numerically the difference was again in the predicted direction, with the List group 
recalling fewer words than the Math group, t(57) = 1.45, p = .15.  Thus, although the 
group differences did not reach statistical significance, numerically they followed the 
predicted trend with participants who recalled the video or the list performing the worst, 
followed by participants in the math control group who recalled the most L1 words. 
These results cautiously suggest that a similar magnitude of internal context change may 
have taken place in the Video and the List group, but given that the differences were not 
statistically significant, evidence from additional dependent measures is warranted to 
support these tentative conclusions.  
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Figure 1. Proportion of L1 Recall in Experiment 1 
 
 
Figure 1. Proportion of L1 recalled as a function of task/condition.  The error bars 
  represent ±SEs of the mean. 
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Time Estimate Results   
In prior work, we found that participants experiencing internal context-change 
were greatly overestimating the duration of the experiment (Sahakyan & Smith, 2014).  
Hence time estimates could provide an independent way of assessing the magnitude of 
context-change in addition to memory. Thus, if the two retrieval groups (List and Video) 
experienced internal context change, then I would expect them to overestimate the 
subjective duration of the experiment compared the math control group.   
The duration of Session 2 was exactly 5.5 minutes.  To determine if there is 
overestimation or underestimation bias, it is typical to calculate the ratio of subjective 
duration to objective duration, where positive values indicate overestimation, and 
negative values indicate underestimation (e.g., Block & Zakay, 1997).  Block and Zakay 
(1997) also point out that these duration ratios allow for comparisons across conditions 
and experiments that utilize different durations—an important step in standardizing 
measures across all time estimation research.  Finally, the recommended procedure is to 
log-transform duration ratios because underestimation is bounded by the lower limit 
because the subjective time estimates cannot be less than zero, whereas overestimation is 
unbounded by the upper limit given that theoretically subjective estimates can be any 
number (Roy & Christenfeld, 2007, 2008).   
A one-way ANOVA using Group as a factor was performed on Session 2 log-
transformed duration ratios (average skewness = -0.08). The results are illustrated in 
Figure 2.  The results failed to reach traditional significance, F(2,81) = 2.24, p = .11,  
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η
2
 = .05.  Comparing the duration ratios of the Video group to the Math control revealed 
significant difference between the two groups, t(55)= 2.27, p < .05.  However, the 
difference between the List and Math groups did not reach significance, t < 1.  If the two 
retrieval groups (Video and List) experienced similar magnitude of context change, they 
should overestimate the duration, and thus I performed a one-sample t-test comparing the 
duration ratios to zero (e.g., accurate estimate). This analysis revealed significant 
overestimation bias in the Video group, t(24) = 2.10, p < .05.  However, the List group 
neither overestimated nor underestimated the duration as its duration ratio was not 
significantly different from zero, t < 1. The same was true also in the Math group, t(31) = 
1.57, p = .13.  Only the Video group’s estimate was significantly different from zero, and 
a comparison of the time estimates for the List and Video groups did not yield significant 
results, t(51) = 1.15, p = .26.   
Overall, the subjective estimates followed a somewhat graded pattern with the 
participants who recalled the video overestimating the duration of Session 2 the most, 
followed by those who recalled L0, followed by the math control group. However, only 
the Video group significantly overestimated the duration of the experiment, whereas the 
List group did not.   
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Figure 2. Time Estimation Accuracy for Session 2 in Experiment 1 
 
Figure 2. Log-transformed duration ratios for Session 2 in Experiment 1.  The 
value 0 corresponds with an estimate equivalent to the objective duration.  The 
error bars represent ±SEs of the means  
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Discussion  
All in all, the results do not support my initial predictions.  In fact, as traditionally 
measured by L1 recall, the manipulations used in Experiment 1 did not produce 
measureable and reliable contextual change for participants, as the differences in L1 
recall rates for the Video and List groups did not differ significantly from the Math 
control.  Furthermore, only the Video group significantly overestimated the Session 2 
duration.  Although the individual analyses of recall and time estimates did not offer 
evidence to support my hypotheses, taken together, they suggest that the type of 
information retrieved from memory may play a role in initiating context change. In prior 
research (e.g., Sahakyan & Smith, 2014), retrospective time estimates in the internal 
context-change conditions showed significant overestimation bias. Namely, conditions 
with most forgetting caused by internal context-change were associated with higher time 
estimates. If duration judgments are markers of internal context change, then one would 
expect an inverse relationship between the recall rates and time estimates as found by 
Sahakyan and Smith (2014).  However, this was only partially the case in the current 
experiment. The L1 recall rate was lower in the Video group than in the Math group, and 
the Video group overestimated the duration of the experiment compared to Math control. 
The lower recall and higher time estimates in the Video group are consistent with the 
notion that this group likely experienced greater internal context-change compared to the 
Math group.   
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Interestingly, although L1 recall rates were similar for the List and Video groups, 
only the Video group overestimated the Session 2 duration.  The List group recalled 
fewer L1 words than the Math group (although the difference was not statistically 
significant), but this group did not overestimate the duration of Session 2.  The List 
group’s time estimates were unbiased.  Thus, it is possible that retrieving a video between 
L1 and L2 may be fundamentally different from recalling a list or doing basic math 
problems in terms of initiating a greater internal context change.  While only the Video 
group’s estimate was significantly different from zero, a comparison of the time estimates 
for the List and Video groups did not yield significant results.  Given this overall pattern 
of results, it is also possible that the type of information retrieved between L1 and L2 
may not influence context change as measured by L1 recall or Session 2 duration 
estimates—at least, not on this time scale (discussed later). 
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CHAPTER V 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 
As previously mentioned, Delaney et al. (2010) found that the magnitude of 
internal context change (as reflected in amount of L1 forgetting) depends on the temporal 
distance of an imagined event/place between the two lists.  Namely, between L1 and L2, 
they had participants remember their parents’ house (or their own house, in the control 
condition) and found that the longer it had been since participants had visited their 
parents’ house, the fewer words they recalled from L1.  Thus, the amount of time that has 
passed between the event and its retrieval time appears to be an important factor in 
driving internal context change. However, a different result was obtained by Sahakyan 
and Hendricks (2012), where between L1 and L2 participants were asked to retrieve a 
previously encoded list (i.e., L0), which was studied either on the same day, one day 
prior, or three days prior to the session where the remaining two lists were studied. 
Sahakyan and Hendricks (2012) found that although retrieving L0 produces internal 
context change and leads to L1 forgetting (compared to solving math between the lists), 
the magnitude of forgetting was unaffected by how long ago L0 was encoded.  
The delay was varied over a period of a few days in Sahakyan and Hendricks 
(2012) study, whereas the delay in the Delaney et al. (2010) study involved several 
weeks.  Delaney and colleagues report that, on average, participants had visited their  
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parents’ house 5.1 weeks ago, whereas, participants asked to imagine their own home 
reported having visited that home only 2.1 hours before (on average). The results of 
Delaney et al. (2010) showed that the delay on the order of hours was irrelevant, but that 
a delay on the order of weeks was more critical for producing differential degree of 
internal context change and concomitant forgetting.  Therefore, the use of different delay 
intervals across the two studies may be one reason for discrepant findings. 
In Experiment 1, I found that retrieving L0 that was studied on the same day 
produces as much forgetting of L1 as retrieving a video, suggesting that the nature of 
event retrieved might not matter for the magnitude of context change. At the same time, 
time estimates suggested that the video group experienced greater context change than 
the list group. It could be that a longer delay separating the sessions where L0 is studied 
and where L1 and L2 are studied is needed to obtain more conclusive evidence about the 
impact of the nature of retrieved events across both dependent measures.  
For this reason, in Experiment 2, I increased the temporal distance between 
Session 1 and Session 2 to two weeks (instead of an hour, as in Experiment 1). Doing so 
allowed the retrieved event (e.g., L0) to fall more closely in line with the temporal 
distance of the events imagined in the Delaney et al. (2010) study.  I expected that greater 
delay between Session 1 and Session 2 should create greater context change between L1 
and L2, thus leading to greater forgetting of L1 during the final memory test in the list 
group.  In addition, a longer delay might allow for a more sensitive comparison between 
the Video and the List group.  Hence, if the nature of retrieved event influences the 
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magnitude of context change, I might be more likely to detect significant difference 
between the Video group and the List group in Experiment 2 due to longer delay 
manipulation.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
METHODS 
 
 
Participants 
 
A total of 78 participants were recruited in this experiment from the participant-
pool at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.  The experiment was completed 
in exchange for course credit.  None of the participants took part in Experiment 1.  
Materials 
 The materials, including words lists, were the same as those used in Experiment 1.  
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, with a few exceptions.  First, the 
delay between Session 1 and Session 2 was lengthened from one hour to two weeks.  
Second, when participants were told to retrieve L0 between L1 and L2 encoding, they 
were provided with the first two letters of each L0 word. A change from free recall of L0 
(in Experiment 1) to cued recall of L0 (in Experiment 2) was done in order to avoid 
potential floor effects after a two-week delay.  Thus, participants were given a sheet of 
paper containing all twelve cues at once. Importantly, in some of their experiments, 
Sahakyan and Hendricks (2012) also used cued recall of L0 instead of the free recall of 
L0, and they found that both types of tests lead to L1 forgetting on the final test.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
 The probability of a Type 1 error was set to .05 for all analyses.  Once again, I 
report memory accuracy measures to assess the magnitude of L1 forgetting effects, then I 
report the time estimation analyses.  Once again, the outliers above 2.5 standard 
deviations from the grand mean for both L1 recall and time estimation were removed 
from the analyses (totaling one participant for recall and one participant for time 
estimation results). 
Recall Results  
In Session 1, the average recall rate for L0 was M = .73, SD = .11.  In Session 2, 
this time after a two-week delay, the average recall rate was lower than in Session 1, (M 
= .23, SD = .17), but not at floor.   
A one-way ANOVA on the proportion of L1 recall using Group (List vs. Video 
vs. Math) as a factor revealed no significant differences, F < 1 (see Figure 3).  Thus, no 
L1 recall differences were found based on the type of task completed between L1 and L2. 
The nearly identical recall rates suggest that either context change did not occur for any 
of the participants in this experiment, or alternatively, everybody experienced similar  
magnitude of context change.  Analyses of time estimation are reported next as they 
might provide further insight about the nature of recall findings.  
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Figure 3. Proportion of L1 Recall in Experiment 2 
  
 
Figure 3.  Proportion of L1 recalled as a function of task/condition in 
Experiment 2.  The error bars represent ±SEs of the means. 
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Time Estimate Results  
A one-way ANOVA using Group as a factor was performed on Session 2 log-
transformed duration ratios (average skewness = -0.31).  As depicted in Figure 4, there 
were no significant group differences, F(2,73) = 1.03, p = .36, ηp
2
= .03 . Follow-up t-tests 
also revealed no significant group differences with neither the Math vs List comparison, 
t(50) = 1.36, p = .18, the List vs Video comparison, t(49) = 1.25, p = .22, nor the Math vs 
Video comparison, t < 1, reaching statistical significance.  The Video group 
overestimated the duration numerically, but this overestimation was not significant, t < 1.  
This was also true for the Math group, which also overestimated the duration 
numerically, but the results were not significant, t(24) = 1.00, p = .33. Finally, the List 
group’s estimate did not reveal any overestimation or underestimation biases, t < 1.   
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Figure 4. Time Estimation Accuracy for Session 2 in Experiment 2  
 
Figure 4. Log-transformed duration ratios for Session 2 in Experiment 2.  The 
value 0 corresponds with an estimate equivalent to the objective duration.  The 
error bars represent ±SEs of the means. 
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Discussion  
Similar to the recall results, the results of time estimation data suggest that either 
no group experienced context change, or all groups experienced context change. Previous 
research shows that conditions experiencing context-change (reflected in lower accuracy 
in those conditions) overestimate the length of the interval.  Thus, one would expect that 
if all groups experience context change, then the time estimates would be biased toward 
overestimation. However, in this experiment, the time estimation results did not differ 
significantly from zero, implying unbiased estimates (or low statistical power to detect 
such effects).  Given that the recall and time estimation data for the List and Video 
conditions are equivalent to the Math control group, it is likely that neither experimental 
condition experienced context change.  This conclusion is also supported by the fact that, 
although a cross-experiment comparison, the recall rates for all groups in Experiment 2 
mirror the recall rates for the Math control group of Experiment 1. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
In two separate experiments, I attempted to expand on our previous work 
(Sahakyan & Smith, 2014), as well as resolve the discrepant findings of Delaney et al. 
(2010) and Sahakyan and Hendricks (2012).  In Experiment 1, both the Video and List 
groups recalled fewer L1 words than the Math control group yet only the Video group 
overestimated the Session 2 duration.  Furthermore, the differences in recall performance 
across the groups did not reach statistical significance.  Despite this fact, the results 
hinted at a trend somewhat similar to the predicted outcome.  The same cannot be said for 
Experiment 2, for which I introduced a longer delay between Session 1 and Session 2 
(compared to Experiment 1).  This second experiment yielded insignificant results for 
both dependent measures.  In fact, there were no differences in recall performance or 
duration estimation across all groups 
It was my expectation that the discrepancy in the results of Delaney et al. (2010) 
and Sahakyan and Hendricks (2012) was not only due to the nature of the items retrieved 
between L1 and L2, but also because of the difference in delays used across both studies.  
Based on previous research (Sahakyan & Smith, 2014), I predicted that conditions of 
context change would elicit poorer L1 recall and higher Session 2 duration estimates.  
Thus, I expected an inverse relationship between recall and duration estimates.  I  
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hypothesized that retrieving a video (which I anticipated would mimic retrieving a 
memory of a vacation/home) should initiate greater levels of context change compared to 
recalling a list or doing math problems, and I expected that this trend might be more 
pronounced if more time had elapsed between the encoding and retrieval of the target 
information.  Nevertheless, the results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 do not support 
my predictions.   
Clearly, more research is needed to determine the exact relationship between 
context change, time estimates, and recall.  Given the results of the current investigation, 
it is not possible to determine the cause of the discrepancy between the Sahakyan and 
Hendricks (2012) and Delaney et al. (2010) studies.  While the results of the two 
experiments do not offer conclusive evidence and they are difficult to reconcile with 
previous research, some factors and variables may help explain some of the discrepancies 
between the current findings and past research.  
For example, in Experiment 1, the overall ANOVA performed on L1 recall and 
Session 2 time estimates did not yield significance, although the individual t-tests 
provided some evidence of group differences, and the graded pattern of both recall and 
time estimation results resembled the predicted pattern to some extent.  Post hoc power 
analyses suggest that these null results may be due to a lack of statistical power.  A meta-
analysis by Smith and Vela (2001) reports that the average effect size for a context 
change experiment involving free recall is Cohen’s d = .29.  A post-hoc power analysis 
reveals that Experiment 1 had only a power of .64 to detect an effect this size.  Similarly, 
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Block and Zakay (1997) performed a meta-analysis on experiments involving 
retrospective time estimates and found an average effect size of Cohen’s d = .33.  A post-
hoc power analysis reveals that Experiment 1 only had a power of .76 to detect such an 
effect.  Although these analyses are post-hoc, they suggest that Experiment 1 was 
possibly underpowered. 
 In Experiment 2, because of the long delay between Session 1 and Session 2, the 
List and Video groups may not have been able to remember the target information from 
Session 1.  The two-week delay mimics the delays found in Delaney et al. (2010), but 
recalling a vivid memory of a very familiar place such as childhood/parent’s home may 
be qualitatively different from recalling a list or video from a few weeks ago.  This is 
especially likely to be the case given that participants were not told that they would be 
asked for such details.  If the previous context cannot be mentally reinstated at all, then it 
would not produce a context change.  This would lead to little or no forgetting.   
In order to assess the possibility that participants were unable to access and 
reinstate the context of Session 1, I analyzed trends in the L0/Video recall data.  My 
examination suggests that participants had great difficulty in accessing the Session 1 
context.  Specifically, the List group in both experiments started out by approximately 
equivalent recall rates in Session 1 (on the average, they recalled 72% of L0 during 
Session 1). However, In Experiment 1, participants that retrieved L0 between the two 
remaining lists in Session 2 recalled 55% of L0. In contrast, in Experiment 2, participants 
who retrieved L0 between the two remaining lists were able to retrieve only 23% of L0.  
 
 
38 
 
This is quite low recall of L0 despite it being cued via letter cues in Experiment 2 as 
opposed to free recall in Experiment 1.  Thus, poor access to L0 episode in Experiment 2 
could be one of the reasons for the observed null effects. Consistent with this argument, 
in Experiment 2, 11% of participants who retrieved L0 in Session 2 could not recall any 
of the words from L0, whereas in Experiment 1, all participants were able to recall at 
least one word from L0.  Similar trends were observed also in the Video group. 
Specifically, in Experiment 1, all Video participants were able to retrieve at least some 
images and details from the video, whereas in Experiment 2, 23% of participants in the 
Video group either could not recall having watched a video at all or could not recall any 
of the details of the video.  In other words, almost a quarter of participants in the Video 
condition in Experiment 2 forgot that they had seen a video, or at best, could not retrieve 
anything specific about that particular memory. It is interesting to note that twice as many 
Video participants (23%) recalled nothing about the video compared to participants in the 
List group, where 11% could not retrieve any L0 words.  One possible explanation is that 
L0 was given multiple presentations along with an immediate test in Session 1, whereas 
the Video group was presented with video only once and was never tested on it except for 
answering three questions about it after watching it. Overall, if both the Video group and 
the List group experienced greater difficulty in reinstating Session 1 context, then they 
would have an equivalent L1 recall because they did not experience an internal context 
change.   
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Although the List group was more likely to retrieve Session 1 information than 
the Video group (many of who completely forgot that they had even seen a video), it is 
nevertheless possible that the List group was able to utilize the letter cues in successfully 
retrieving L0 items without necessarily successfully reinstating the Session 1 context.  
Thus, even though the List group’s L0 recall rates are above floor, it is possible that they 
are not indicative of successful context change but are instead driven by the availability 
of letter-cues.  Although previous research successfully used letter cues to help retrieve 
L0 (Sahakyan & Hendricks, 2012; Sahakyan & Smith, 2014), those studies did not 
incorporate any delay manipulation between the lists, and it is possible that a combination 
of delay and the provision of letter cues interact in some ways to circumvent context 
accessibility. If L0 is relatively recent, then the letter cues may play no active role in 
helping retrieve those items because L0 could be reinstated even without those letter 
cues. In contrast, when L0 is more “old”, then participants are more likely to rely on the 
letter cues to help retrieve those items, and the more they rely on the letter cues, the less 
likely they may be to utilize contextual information (e.g., Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1980).  
Overall, it is my conclusion that Experiment 1 was underpowered, which may 
have contributed to some of the null findings.  It is well established that recall results are 
reliable indicators of context change and, ignoring the Video condition, Experiment 1 is a 
direct replication of a typical LBL experiment.  Thus, the null recall results in Experiment 
1 are the prime indication that more participants were needed in order to achieve 
statistical significance.  Had more participants been included, it is possible that the time-
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estimation results could have also achieved significance—and, although this is only 
speculation, the obtained trend suggests a possible relationship.  Given the typical effect 
sizes found in context change research, future research involving a similar experiment 
will require recruiting a relatively large sample of participants.  An a priori power 
analysis for a repetition of the current research reveals that one should include 40 
participants in each condition in order to obtain appropriate statistical power 
(disregarding outliers). Experiment 2 did not suffer from the same shortcoming.  Instead, 
the results suggest that the context-change manipulations failed.  Not only were there no 
group differences found in recall rates, none of the groups’ time estimates differed from 
the objective duration.  Future research should strive to include measures that would 
ensure that target context is more actively utilized and retrievable especially after a long 
delay. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
STIMULI USED IN EXPERIMENT 1 AND 2 
 
 
LIST A LIST B LIST C 
artist beaver baby 
bench bottle candle 
carpet cattle gazelle 
flower dress guitar 
knife hotel insect 
monkey leader jacket 
ostrich market mouse 
person quilt opera 
radio street paper 
ticket tiger pupil 
uncle voter snail 
watch zebra sugar 
 
 
 
 
